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Abstract 
Recent Bayesian reanalyses of prominent trials in critical illness have generated controversy by 
contradicting the initial frequentist conclusions. Many clinicians may be skeptical that Bayesian 
analysis, a philosophical and statistical approach that combines prior beliefs with data to generate 
probabilities, provides more useful information about the meaning of clinical trials than the 
conventional frequentist approach. In this Personal View we introduce clinicians to the rationale, 
process, and interpretation of Bayesian analysis through a systematic review and reanalysis of 
interventional trials in critical illness. In the majority of cases, Bayesian and frequentist analyses 
agreed. In the remainder, Bayesian analysis identified interventions where benefit was probable 
despite the absence of statistical significance, where interpretation depended substantially on choice 
of prior distribution, and where benefit was improbable despite statistical significance. Bayesian 
analysis in critical care medicine can help distinguish harm from uncertainty and establish the 
probability of clinically important benefit for clinicians, policymakers, and patients. 
Key Messages 
1. Bayesian analysis is an alternative approach to analyzing trial data which has potential 
advantages in comparison to conventional frequentist analysis including methods to 
incorporate prior information, the capacity to compare results to clinically relevant thresholds, 
and the ability to answer the clinical question “what is the probability that this therapy will 
benefit a patient?” 
8
2. This study used Bayesian reanalysis across a systematic sample of randomized trials of patients 
with critical illness to investigate the extent to which the use of Bayesian reanalysis would 
revise the conclusions of trials originally analyzed with a frequentist approach. 
3. Frequentist and Bayesian analyses generally agreed. However, Bayesian analysis identified 
some trials where clinically relevant benefit was probable despite the absence of statistical 
significance, where interpretation depended substantially on the prior information, and where 
clinically relevant benefit was improbable despite statistical significance. 




For the overall manuscript (not for the trials included in the reanalyses) we searched MEDLINE and 
Google Scholar for articles published before May 1, 2020. We used the search terms “Bayesian 
analysis”, “Bayes”, “Bayesian”, and “Bayesian reanalysis.” We also reviewed reference lists, 
bibliographies, and our personal files for additional relevant articles. The citations were chosen to 
provide a range of entries into Bayesian analysis for interested clinicians, including textbooks 
(Spiegelhalter, McElreath, and Kruschke) and antecedent review articles (Wijeysundera, Kalil); 
several citations relating to ongoing controversies in Frequentist statistics (Amrhein, Greenland); 
and examples of Bayesian reanalyses in critical illness (Goligher, Zampieri). Additional citations 
were included when helpful to support the research approach. Only articles published in English 
were included.  
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Introduction 
Randomized trials evaluating interventions in critical illness are nearly universally analyzed using 
frequentist statistics. However, frequentist analysis addresses the probability of the data assuming 
there is no difference between treatment and control. This can lead to potentially misleading results 
that may cause critical care clinicians to abandon therapies where benefit is possible or adopt 
therapies where benefit is equivocal.1–4 Challenges to interpreting frequentist analysis include multiple 
hypothesis testing, difficulty comprehending the proper meaning of the p-value and confidence 
intervals, inability to estimate the probability of clinical benefit, and no mechanism for incorporating 
prior information.2,4,5 A Bayesian approach can address some aspects of these challenges6–10 but the 
extent to which the systematic application of Bayesian analysis would revise interpretations of trial 
analyses in critical illness has not been evaluated.  
Unlike frequentist analysis, Bayesian analysis can directly estimate the probability of clinically 
meaningful treatment benefit,7–11 a quantity of direct interest and intuitive meaning for clinicians. 
Bayesian analysis combines observed trial data with prior information derived from expert opinion, 
clinical experience, basic science, and previous trials.8,12,13 Critics of Bayesian analysis maintain that the 
incorporation of prior information introduces subjectivity into scientific analyses and is used to reframe 
“negative” trial results as “positive.”3,14,15 However, clinicians unavoidably interpret trial results in light 
of prior information based on known mechanisms of effect and previously available data. Bayesian 
analysis aims to make the influence of this background information explicit by enabling investigators to 
quantify the influence of such prior information on the interpretation of the trial results.7–10,16–21
Bayesian analyses are particularly relevant in critical care because many trials are too small to exclude 
minimally important differences in mortality. Prior information is most important when sample sizes 
are small to ensure a single underpowered but high-profile trial does not unduly spark widespread 
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adoption or premature abandonment of an intervention for which confident conclusions about efficacy 
require additional data.22–24 Recent Bayesian re-analyses have suggested alternative interpretations of 
important trials6,25–27. The extent to which the systematic application of Bayesian analysis would re-
interpret the available literature in clinical trials in critical care is uncertain. 
The aim of this study was to determine the prevalence and nature of potential discordance between 
Bayesian and frequentist analyses of trials of critically ill patients and assess the extent to which 
Bayesian analyses may enhance scientific and clinical decision-making when interpreting trial results. 
Methods 
Systematic Review 
The data are drawn from a systematic review focused on design bias and clinically important effects in 
trials of therapies for critical illness (Supplement).28 Included studies were multicenter randomized 
superiority trials in critically ill patients with mortality as the primary outcome published between Jan 
1, 2008 and Dec 31, 2018 in one of five journals: American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care 
Medicine, Journal of the American Medical Association, The Lancet, The Lancet Respiratory Medicine, 
or New England Journal of Medicine. Journal selection was based on journals most likely to publish 
trials influential to trial design and clinical practice in critical illness, using both impact factor and 
content relevance. Critical illness was defined as illness or injury that “acutely impairs one or more vital 
organ systems such that there is a high probability of imminent or life-threatening deterioration in the 
patient’s condition” in accordance with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services definition.29
The timeframe was chosen to reflect trials designed after the uptake of lung-protective ventilation. 
Non-inferiority or cluster trials were excluded. Please refer to the supplement or reference 28 for 
details. 
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Minimum clinically important differences 
The minimum clinically important difference (MCID) is the minimum benefit that patients or clinicians 
require from a therapy before they consider it beneficial; in the context of mortality, it can be defined 
as the minimum difference required to change clinical practice.30,31 The MCID helps differentiate 
between statistical and clinical significance. 31–34 MCIDs are useful in Bayesian analysis because they 
provide clinically relevant thresholds for evaluating results or setting prior distributions. We estimated 
MCIDs by presenting 10 practicing critical care physicians with only the Background and Methods 
sections of the abstract for each included trial and then asking them to provide an estimate of “the 
smallest absolute risk reduction in mortality that would cause you to use this intervention.” The studies 
were presented to each clinician in a different random order and clinicians were blinded to the MCID 
estimates of other clinicians. The median value among the 10 estimates for each trial was used as its 
MCID in the subsequent Bayesian analysis.  
Bayesian Analysis 
Basic principles and terminology of Bayesian analysis are outlined in Box 1. Absolute risk reduction was 
used as the outcome in prior and posterior distributions. The work adheres to the ROBUST criteria for 
Bayesian analysis reporting.35 All analyses were conducted using RStudio version 1.2.503336 and R 
version 3.6.337.  
Priors, Likelihoods, and Posteriors 
Priors for the absolute risk reduction (ARR) were specified using normal distributions based on the 
approach of Spiegelhalter.7,8 The uninformative prior was an improper prior set to a constant value.38
The informative priors had mean set to be either skeptical (ARR = 0) or enthusiastic (ARR =2*MCID) 
with variance set to be equivalent to a 400-person randomized trial with mortality equivalent to the 
predicted control arm mortality used for sample size calculation. The rationale for setting the variance 
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equal to a 400-person randomized trial is that in critical care medicine trials of this size can be 
influential but if the prior distributions contained more information then the implied certainty might 
violate accepted standards of equipoise. Further details of prior distributions are available in Table E4. 
The likelihood function was a normal distribution with mean and variance equal to their sample 
counterparts. If both prior and likelihood are normal distributions, the posterior is also a normal 
distribution.8
Outcomes 
Outcomes were computed from the posterior distributions of absolute risk reduction for each 
intervention. Bayesian analyses were described as showing potential benefit if there was a greater than 
50% probability that the absolute risk reduction equaled or exceeded the MCID and described as 
showing improbable benefit otherwise. The threshold of 50% was chosen because it represents the 
point where an outcome goes from unlikely (on average, does not happen) to likely (on average, does 
happen). Higher posterior probability of benefit may be preferred to support practice change for many 
therapies. 
The primary outcome was the proportion of trials for which dichotomous interpretations of Bayesian 
and frequentist trials yielded potentially discordant conclusions, which occurred if:  
(1) the trial was positive by frequentist criteria (p < 0.05 and signal showing benefit) but the posterior 
probability of achieving the MCID was less than 50% or;  
(2) the trial was indeterminate or negative by frequentist criteria (p > 0.05 or signal showing harm) but 
the posterior probability of achieving the MCID was greater than 50%.  
For frequentist analyses, if a trial reported a time-to-event mortality analysis in addition to binary 
mortality outcome at 28 or 60 days, the latter was used for p-value calculation. 
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Rates of potential discordance were computed using each of the three archetypal prior distributions 
(skeptical, uninformative, enthusiastic). Comparison using the skeptical prior was chosen for the 
primary outcome to reflect the belief, independent of intervention mechanism, that very large benefits 
or harms are unlikely in an evaluation of an intervention with clinical equipoise. 
Sensitivity and reversal analyses 
Sensitivity analyses assessed more conservative posterior probability thresholds, varying treatment 
effect thresholds, and a prior distribution where harm was likely. The frequency of potential 
discordance was computed using higher thresholds for probability of potential clinical benefit (75%, 
90%). Additional clinical thresholds included any benefit (ARR > 0%) and the planned effect size 
obtained from each trial’s sample size calculation. The prior distribution representing probable harm 
from treatment had mean set to an increase in mortality equal in magnitude to the MCID and variance 
set to be equivalent to a 100-person randomized trial. A lower certainty was used for the prior positing 
probable harm because equipoise implies that the evidence in support of harm from an intervention is 
not strong in order for it to be tested in a randomized trial.  
The extent to which the interpretation of a trial could be significantly influenced by prior beliefs was 
assessed by evaluating for prior-dependent reversal. Reversal was said to be present if a trial showed 
improbable benefit (posterior probability <50%) under the skeptical prior but potential benefit 
(posterior probability >50%) under the enthusiastic prior. 
Results 
Clinical trial characteristics 
Eighty-two interventions published over 11 years were included (Table E1, Supplement). Median trial 
sample size was 1,030 (IQR 507-1,917) patients. Thirteen (16%) trials received industry funding, 24 
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(30%) were stopped early, and 47 (57%) involved non-pharmacologic interventions. Eight trials (10%) 
reported p < 0.05 in their primary analysis, of which four showed benefit and four showed harm. 
Estimating the minimum clinically important difference 
The minimum clinically important difference (MCID) for each trial ranged from 1% (3 trials) to 5% (6 
trials) (Table E2 in Supplement). The MCIDs for pharmacologic interventions (median 2.5% [IQR 2-3%]) 
were similar to the MCIDs for non-pharmacologic interventions (median 3% [IQR 2-4%]) (Figure E2). 
Effect sizes used to plan trials were considerably larger than the MCIDs (median difference 5.5% [IQR 
3%-7%]) (Table E3). Details about MCID estimators are available in the Supplement. 
Trial results from Bayesian analysis 
The posterior probability of absolute risk reduction greater than or equal to the MCID exceeded 50% in 
9 trials (11%) under the skeptical prior, 14 trials (17%) under the uninformative prior, and 22 trials 
(27%) under the enthusiastic prior. 
Comparison of results from frequentist and Bayesian analyses 
The relationship between the posterior probability of benefit (ARR ≥ MCID) and p-value is depicted in 
Figure 1 according to each prior.  
Among 78 trials found to be indeterminate or negative by frequentist criteria, the posterior probability 
of ARR ≥ MCID exceeded 50% in 7 (9%) trials under the skeptical prior, 12 (15%) under the 
uninformative prior (listed in Table 2), and 20 (26%) trials under the enthusiastic prior (Table 1).  
Among 4 trials with a statistically significant signal for benefit under frequentist criteria, the posterior 
probability of clinical benefit (ARR ≥ MCID) was less than 50% across all prior distributions in two trials. 
Among 4 trials reporting statistically significant harm (p<0.05), the probability of clinical benefit was 
11% or less under all priors. 
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The two trials showing potential benefit in both Bayesian and frequentist analyses across all priors 
were the Guérin 2013 trial of proning in ARDS39 and the Annane 2018 trial of hydrocortisone with 
fludrocortisone in septic shock.40
Sensitivity analyses using alternative clinical thresholds (“any benefit” i.e. ARR > 0% or “planned effect” 
i.e. ARR > effect size used for sample size calculation) and higher posterior probability thresholds are 
shown in Table 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3. Increasing the thresholds for clinical benefit and increasing 
the posterior probability thresholds to define benefit reduced the number of trials with potential 
discordance between frequentist and Bayesian analyses (Table 1).  
Susceptibility of trial interpretation to shifting priors 
Shifting the prior from skeptical to enthusiastic reversed the Bayesian interpretation of the trial from 
improbable benefit (≤ 50% posterior probability of ARR ≥ MCID) to potential benefit (>50% posterior 
probability of ARR ≥ MCID) in 12 trials (15% of all trials). When using higher posterior probability 
thresholds of 75% or 90% to define potential benefit, shifting the priors from skeptical to enthusiastic 
reversed the Bayesian interpretation in 5 (6%) trials and 3 (4%) trials, respectively. Reversal was less 
likely at higher sample sizes (Figure 3). The trials with reversal according to the choice of prior are 
listed in Table E5.  
The study is accompanied by an interactive application available at 
https://cyarnell.shinyapps.io/BRICCS-Interactive-App/ which allows investigation of the effects of 
different prior distributions according to user-selected outlook, certainty, and MCID. 
Discussion 
Across 82 clinical trials in critical care medicine published in high-impact journals, discordance between 
Bayesian and frequentist analyses was relatively uncommon. However, this investigation identified 
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multiple trials where clinical benefit was more likely than not despite p-value > 0.05 and trials where 
clinical benefit was unlikely despite frequentist analysis suggesting benefit. We also identified trials 
where the probability of clinical benefit varied substantially according to choice of prior distribution, 
suggesting that these trials did not accrue sufficient information to resolve uncertainty about 
treatment effect. These examples demonstrate how incorporating Bayesian analyses into the reporting 
of trials may enhance and clarify their interpretation. Importantly, the post hoc Bayesian analyses 
presented in this paper should be interpreted as exploratory and hypothesis-generating, not definitive 
statements about treatment efficacy.  
By estimating the probability of treatment benefit rather than the probability of obtaining the 
observed effect or greater under the null hypothesis, Bayesian analysis provides a more direct 
assessment of the strength of the evidence for or against an intervention. Bayesian analysis may 
disagree with frequentist analysis, depending on the posterior probability of benefit one requires to 
support use of a given therapy.18–20,41,42 For example, this investigation identified several cases where 
the posterior probability of benefit was greater than 50% but the frequentist p-value exceeded 0.05. 
Most trials of interventions in critical illness are indeterminate by frequentist criteria43 (p-value 
exceeds 0.05), so it is helpful to have a method that further clarifies the certainty with which potential 
benefit has been ruled out.  
Two key points should be noted. First, our results show that Bayesian analysis cannot be regarded 
simply as a means of turning ‘negative’ results into ‘positive’ results. We found that Bayesian and 
frequentist analyses are discordant in only a minority of cases. The impression that Bayesian analysis 
converts indeterminate results into favourable ones may arise from a kind of publication bias whereby 
Bayesian reanalyses haveoften focused on trials with p-value > 0.05 and a large positive effect size, a 
scenario where Bayesian analysis is more likely to suggest potential benefit.6,26 Second, it must be 
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appreciated that there is no fixed value for posterior probability of benefit at which one can conclude 
that a treatment should be routinely employed in practice. Such judgments may depend on many 
considerations (e.g., adverse effects, costs, preferences, specific clinical scenario, patient goals and 
values). The strength of the evidence measured by posterior probability can be used to determine 
whether further investigation is required, to inform decision analyses, to formulate guideline 
recommendations, and to make clinical decisions.  
Bayesian analysis enables investigators to incorporate judgments about minimum clinically important 
differences into quantitative analysis. Ideally these judgments are pre-specified in order to distinguish 
between statistical and clinical significance.32,34,44 We found that the choice of MCID had an important 
influence on the interpretation of trials; indeed, there was low probability of benefit (as defined in 
terms of the MCID) in two trials deemed positive by frequentist criteria. Several considerations must 
be borne in mind. First, the choice of the MCID may vary by patient, clinician, or setting, and a lower 
MCID may reverse the conclusion. In our study, MCID estimates varied widely between authors for any 
given trial, suggesting substantial variability in judgments of clinically important treatment benefits and 
highlighting the need for more research into how judgments about MCID should be formulated. The 
MCIDs determined by the process used in this study were similar to published MCIDs in cardiac arrest 
literature34 and generally much lower than the effect sizes used to plan the trials. Second, the MCID 
refers to a single outcome and does not include other potential benefits from a therapy. For example, a 
decrease in bleeding from tranexamic acid may improve both mortality and other outcomes related to 
severe bleeding not captured by a mortality endpoint. Third, although the absolute risk reduction is a 
more intuitively accessible measure of treatment effect and the measure on which MCIDs were 
defined, the relative risk may be the more generalizable measure—when a therapy is employed in a 
population with a higher baseline risk there may be an accompanying increased absolute benefit that 
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exceeds the MCID. Last, our MCIDs were much smaller than the effect sizes used to plan the trial, 
meaning that the trials would be very unlikely to have sufficient statistical power to exclude a benefit 
equal to or smaller than the MCIDs we used. This may reflect the fact that trials are often planned 
based on the feasibility of patient recruitment to a given sample size, rather than based on the MCID s 
that are deemed to be feasible. To assist with clinical interpretation of trial results, future randomized 
trials should incorporate prospectively defined minimum clinically important differences for the 
primary outcome and use these for sample size calculations. 
Several trials showed substantial variation in the posterior probability of clinical benefit according to 
choice of prior distribution. This is a quantitative expression of scientific controversy due to insufficient 
data, where the adoption of a skeptical stance as opposed to enthusiastic stance leads to different 
conclusions about its efficacy. One prominent example was the trial “Effect of Noninvasive Ventilation 
vs. Oxygen Therapy on Mortality Among Immunocompromised Patients With Acute Respiratory 
Failure”45, which had a posterior probability of clinical benefit of 33% under skeptical priors that 
increased to 70% under enthusiastic priors. Shift in posterior probability of clinical benefit across 
different priors decreased with sample size. This analytical approach provides a means of quantifying 
the information available from a clinical trial and clarifies the basis for sample size calculation: a clinical 
trial should enroll a sufficient number of patients to obtain sufficient information to achieve consensus 
as to the presence or absence of meaningful treatment effect among both skeptics and enthusiasts.  
This secondary analysis of randomized trials has several limitations. The most important limitation is 
that Bayesian analysis does not directly address inadequacy in fundamental aspects of trial design and 
conduct including enrolment, blinding, randomization, protocol adherence, outcome selection, 
measurement error, or missing data. Heterogeneity of treatment effect is an additional potential 
challenge in critical care trials which is not addressed by this analysis, although Bayesian hierarchical 
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regression provides a powerful tool to analyze heterogeneity across predefined subgroups.46 A further 
limitation is that the analysis focuses on concordance and discordance between Bayesian and 
frequentist analyses, potentially perpetuating a dichotomous approach to trial interpretation based on 
arbitrary thresholds for p-values or posterior probabilities. Individual trials should report the full 
posterior probability distribution in order to communicate the largest amount of information to 
readers. The goal of this investigation was different and intended to investigate the prevalence of 
discordance across multiple studies, which demands potentially arbitrary thresholds. 
Further limitations relate to inherently subjective decisions in statistical modeling. Different 
implementations of a Bayesian approach for each trial may yield different results from those in this 
investigation.6,18,42,47–49 Our priors were defined as normal distributions based on pre-specified rules 
and only connected to their particular clinical scenario by the estimates of MCID. Alternative choices 
for the distributions such as beta-binomial or alternative methods for eliciting priors and MCIDs might 
obtain more appropriate distributions, although our spectrum of prior distributions encompassed a 
wide range of potential priors.50 Determining the MCID and posterior probability of benefit necessary 
to use a given treatment could facilitate more personalized care by involving patients and families in 
decisions on these points. The use of online calculators such as that provided above could be 
implemented to quickly obtain posterior probability estimates that can help with shared decision-
making. 
Covariate adjustment was not used to improve precision as a consequence of using study-level data as 
opposed to individual-level data. Analytically, some criticisms of frequentist analysis could be 
addressed by a more thoughtful use of frequentist analytical tools and may not require adopting a 
Bayesian approach.51 From a clinical perspective, the analysis was limited to critical care trials, which 
increased the coherence of results across trials and enabled informed MCID estimation but sacrificed 
21
external validity. The MCID was assumed to be homogeneous across patients. This analysis did not 
consider secondary efficacy or safety endpoints, the totality of which are essential for interpretation of 
any clinical trial. 
Conclusion 
Bayesian and frequentist analyses of clinical trials generally yield concordant interpretations. However, 
Bayesian analysis may identify interventions where clinically important benefit is more probable than 
not despite the absence of frequentist statistical significance, where interpretation depends 
substantially on the choice of prior distribution, or where clinically important benefit is improbable 
despite frequentist statistical significance. Bayesian analysis can complement conventional frequentist 
statistics by distinguishing between indeterminate and negative results, quantifying the influence of 
prior beliefs, and providing direct estimates of the probability of clinical benefit.  
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Box 1: Glossary of statistical terms  
The glossary below uses the example of a clinical trial designed to estimate the absolute risk 
reduction (ARR) for mortality between a new therapy and a standard therapy. 
Bayesian inference: A form of inference that can use probability to quantify the evidence about 
an unknown quantity such as the absolute risk.  A Bayesian analysis can find that there is, for 
example, a 60% probability that the absolute risk reduction is 3% or more. For a particular 
observed set of results from a clinical trial, these Bayesian probabilities can differ between 
analyses that use different prior distributions. 
Bayes’ Rule:  An equation expressing the relationship between prior probability, the likelihood 
of observed data, and posterior probability given the observed data.  
Confidence interval (95%): An interval used in frequentist inference where 95% of intervals 
constructed in that manner with data generated in the same way will contain the true value. 
For a given confidence interval, such as -1.5% to +2.0%, it is not correct to say that there is 95% 
confidence or 95% probability that the absolute risk lies between -1.5% and +2.0%. Any 
individual confidence interval either does or does not contain the true value. 
Credible interval (95%): An interval used in Bayesian inference that is constructed such that 
there is a 95% chance that the true value lies in the interval, given the choice of model, prior 
distribution, and data.
Enthusiastic prior: This is one kind of archetypal prior. A prior distribution is described as 
enthusiastic if it expresses the view that the new therapy is beneficial and has a small chance of 
increasing mortality. For example, an enthusiastic prior for the absolute risk could be centered 
at an ARR of 5% and put only a 10% prior probability on values of ARR < 0% (harm). 
Frequentist inference: A form of inference where probabilities are equal to proportions of 
frequencies calculated over hypothetical replications of a study.  P-values and confidence 
intervals are common quantities calculated in frequentist inference.  
Likelihood function: A mathematical function that calculates the probability of the observed 
data given a particular value of the absolute risk and the control group risk. Used in both 
frequentist and Bayesian inference. 
Minimum clinically important difference (MCID): An example of a threshold chosen for clinical 
relevance to aid in interpretation of analyses. In this study the MCID is specific to an 
intervention and an outcome and represents the smallest treatment effect which would cause 
the clinician in question to change their practice. 
Posterior distribution: The probability distribution that is the output of a Bayesian analysis. It 
can be interrogated to give the probability that the quantity of interest falls in certain ranges, 
for example, the probability that the absolute risk reduction is greater than the minimum 
clinically relevant effect. 
Prior distribution: A probability distribution that summarizes information about the absolute 
risk reduction that does not come from the trial. It is one of the inputs to a Bayesian analysis. 
The prior distribution can be constructed based on any combination of data from other sources, 
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knowledge of the local clinical context, understanding of the physiologic mechanism, personal 
experience, outcomes of related or similar trials, or opinion. The choice of any particular prior 
distribution must be justified.  
Probability distribution: A probability distribution is a function that takes as input the value of a 
particular parameter (for example, absolute risk reduction) and outputs a probability (or 
probability density if the parameter is continuous) that the parameter takes that value.  
P-value: One of the two most common outputs of a frequentist analysis. It is the probability of 
obtaining a result as or more extreme than the observed result in the actual trial, assuming the 
null hypothesis is true.  
Skeptical prior: This is one kind of archetypal prior. A prior distribution is described as skeptical 
if it expresses the view that the new therapy likely has no effect and puts little prior probability 
on values of the absolute risk reduction that represent important increases or decreases in 
mortality. For example, a skeptical prior for the absolute risk reduction could be a normal 
distribution centered at a value of 0 – representing no difference between treatment and 
control arms – and with a total 20% probability on values of the absolute risk reduction greater 
than the minimum clinically relevant effect.  
Uninformative prior: This is one kind of archetypal prior. A prior distribution is described as 
uninformative if it contains little-to-no information. For example, quantifying complete 
ignorance by allowing the prior distribution to be uniform across all possible values of absolute 
risk reduction (all possible values are equally likely) results in an uninformative prior, because it 
contains no information about what the particular value of absolute risk reduction will be. 
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Table 1 





Outcome of frequentist analysis 
Positive (4) Negative or 
indeterminate (78)
MCID Skeptical > 90% 1 (25%) 0 (0%)
> 75% 2 (50%) 2 (3%)
> 50% 2 (50%) 7 (9%)
Uninformative > 90% 2 (50%) 1 (1%) 
> 75% 2 (50%) 7 (9%)
> 50% 2 (50%) 12 (15%)
Enthusiastic > 90% 2 (50%) 2 (3%)
> 75% 2 (50%) 7 (9%)
> 50% 2 (50%) 19 (24%)
Any benefit (ARR>0) Skeptical > 50% 4 (100%) 36 (46%)
> 90% 4 (100%) 3 (4%)
Uninformative > 50% 4 (100%) 36 (46%)
> 90% 4 (100%) 7 (9%)
Enthusiastic > 50% 4 (100%) 61 (78%)
> 90% 4 (100%) 18 (23%)
Planned effect Skeptical > 50% 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Uninformative > 50% 1 (25%) 0 (0%)
Enthusiastic > 50% 0 (0%) 1 (1%)
MCID = Minimum clinically important difference 
ARR = Absolute risk reduction 
This table shows the number and percentage of studies according to frequentist classification (fourth 
and fifth columns) where the posterior probability of achieving clinical benefit (defined by first column) 
according to each prior (second column) is greater than the posterior probability threshold (third 
column). For example, among studies classified as negative by frequentist criteria there are zero 
studies where the posterior probability of clinical benefit exceeds 90% using the skeptical prior 
distribution and the MCID as the threshold for clinical benefit. 
25
Table 2 
Manuscript Name Unadjusted Mortality Result (intervention versus 
control) 
P value Median Posterior ARR 
(95% credible 
interval)
Threshold value for treatment effect 








ARR ≥ MCID ARR ≤ 0
Effect of Noninvasive Ventilation vs. Oxygen Therapy 
on Mortality Among Immunocompromised Patients 
With Acute Respiratory Failure45
28-day mortality  
24% (non-invasive ventilation) vs. 27% (oxygen 
therapy) 
0.47 3.2% (-5.6 to 12%) 3% 33 52% 24% 
Permissive Underfeeding or Standard Enteral 
Feeding in Critically Ill Adults52
90-day mortality 
27% (underfeeding) vs. 29% (standard) 
0.58 1.7% (-4.2 to 7.6%) 1.5% 67 52% 29%
Transfusion of plasma, platelets, and red blood cells 
in a 1:1:1 vs. a 1:1:2 ratio and mortality in patients 
with severe trauma53
30-day mortality  
22% (1:1:1) vs. 26% (1:1:2:O 
0.24 3.8% (-2.6 to 10%) 3% 33 60% 12% 
Positive End-Expiratory Pressure Setting in Adults
With Acute Lung Injury and Acute Respiratory 
Distress Syndrome54
28-day mortality 
28% (high PEEP) vs. 31% (low PEEP) 
0.31 3.4% (-3.1 to 9.8%) 2.5% 40 60% 15%
Vasopressin versus norepinephrine infusion in 
patients with septic shock55
28-day mortality 
35% (vasopressin) vs. 39% (norepinephrine) 
0.26 3.9% (-2.9 to 11%) 2.5% 40 66% 13%
Prednisolone (or Pentoxifylline) for Alcoholic 
Hepatitis56
28-day mortality 
14% (prednisolone) vs. 18% (placebo)
0.07 4.2% (-0.3 to 8.6%) 2.5% 40 77% 3%
Extracorporeal Membrane Oxygenation for Severe 
Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome25
60-day mortality  
35% (ECMO) vs. 46% (usual care) 
0.10 10.1% (-2.0 to 22%) 5.5% 18 77% 5% 
Amiodarone, Lidocaine, or Placebo in Out-of-
Hospital Cardiac Arrest57
Hospital mortality 
76% (amiodarone) vs. 79% (placebo)
0.07 3.4% (-0.2 to 7.1%) 2% 50 77% 3%
Neuromuscular blockers in early acute respiratory 
distress syndrome58
90-day mortality 32% (neuromuscular blocker) 
vs. 41% (usual care) 
0.08 9.1% (-1.1 to 19%) 4% 25 84% 4% 
Comparison of dopamine and norepinephrine in the 
treatment of shock59
28-day mortality 
49%(norepinephrine) vs. 53% (dopamine) 
0.10 4.0% (-0.8 to 8.8%) 1.5% 67 84% 5%
Effect of Dexmedetomidine on Mortality and 
Ventilator-Free Days in Patients Requiring 
Mechanical Ventilation With Sepsis60
28-day mortality 23% vs. 31% 0.14 8.7% (-2.9 to 20%) 2.5% 40 85% 7% 
Early lactate-guided therapy in intensive care unit 
patients61
Hospital mortality 
34% (lactate-guided) vs. 44% (usual care)
0.07 9.6% (0 to 20%) 2% 50 93% 3%
*Computed from estimated minimum clinically important difference (NNT = 100/MCID) 
This table shows information about the studies where Bayesian analysis showed potential benefit despite frequentist analysis having a p-value > 0.05. 
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Table 3 
Problem Description of problem in conventional analysis of 
critical care trials 
Explanation of how a Bayesian approach could address this 
problem 
Quantitative use of external 
information in trial analyses 
Conventional trials do not quantify the influence of prior 
information in the analysis of a trial. 
A Bayesian approach, including determination of a minimum 
clinically important difference and a set of defensible priors 
combining data and expert opinion, can provide the 
probability of benefit based on prior information and trial 
data. 
Insufficient sample size Sample sizes in critical illness trials are often too small to 
exclude clinically important differences in mortality and 
other outcomes. 
Communicating results as the posterior probability of 
exceeding different clinically-relevant thresholds provides 
greater insight into the meaning of results from small trials as 
to whether treatment benefit has been adequately ruled in or 
out and whether there is persistent equipoise. The Bayesian 
paradigm can guide sample size estimation by clarifying the 
amount of information (sample size) required to achieve 
consensus across all defensible priors. 
Applying results to clinical 
practice 
Frequentist analyses provide no formal methods to guide 
how results might be adapted at the bedside depending 
on a clinician’s informed skepticism or enthusiasm for 
that therapy in that patient. 
Knowing the probability of exceeding a clinically relevant 
threshold under different priors is more aligned with day-to-
day clinical problem solving. 
Adopting therapies with 
minimal clinical benefit 
No benefit is too small to generate a significant p-value, if 
a trial enrolls enough patients. In clinical practice, 
patients and clinicians may require a certain amount of 
benefit before adopting or using a therapy. 
The Bayesian approach allows flexible calculation of the 
probability of benefit at different thresholds which can be 
selected based on the characteristics of individuals or 
populations. 
Abandoning therapies with 
potential clinical benefit 
Interpretations of frequentist analyses may conflate 
indeterminate and truly negative results, leading to 
abandonment of therapies where clinical benefit has not 
been ruled out. 
The posterior probability distribution quantifies the extent to 
which clinical benefit has or has not been ruled out. 
Controversy about small trials 
with extreme results 
Frequentist trials are analyzed in isolation, occasionally 
leading to strongly positive results that generate 
controversy or premature adoption of a therapy. 
Quantifying the extent to which results change across 
differing prior distributions helps quantify the degree of 
scientific uncertainty around results from small trials. 
Stopping trial enrolment for 
futility or benefit  
Complicated rules around p-values and interim analyses 
can lead to early stopping of trials that could still have 
contributed helpful data to a clinical question. 
Results from Bayesian analyses are not contingent on what 
you intended to do and allow decisions about stopping or 
continuing a trial to be based on the probability that a therapy 
will be beneficial. 
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Nonstandard trial designs 
require complex statistics 
Nonstandard trial designs such as adaptive trials are 
potentially helpful yet awkward to design and analyze 
with frequentist principles. 
Bayesian approaches make adaptive trial designs more 
analytically feasible. 
Gleaning insights from 
subgroup analyses is difficult 
Trials often include several clinically relevant subgroups 
but frequentist analysis requires either complex 
multiplicity corrections or the qualifier “exploratory”; 
trials often lack the sample size to demonstrate a 
definitive answer for the entire trial population, let alone 
a relevant subgroup. 
Posterior probability distributions can be derived for the 
treatment effect in any subgroup of a trial, and prior 
distributions can also be specified for any subgroup. Bayesian 
hierarchical regression is a more sophisticated technique well-
suited for this problem.46
Forming clinical guidelines 
from trial data requires 
accurate synthesis of data 
from multiple studies and 
trials 
Frequentist analyses are quantitatively isolated and 
combining results through meta-analysis may not capture 
the full spectrum of information available in cohort or 
physiologic studies. 
Investigating the range of posterior probabilities according to 
prior information could help make clinical guideline 
formulation from randomized trials more intuitive and 
informed. 
Statistical support is required 
for safe conduct of 
randomized trials 
Conventional frequentist trials often retain advanced 
statistical support for study design and analysis. 
Trials designed with a Bayesian approach may require more 
specialized statistical support and expertise, which may be a 
barrier for some investigators and trials groups. 
Trial outcomes may not be 
important to patients or 
clinicians 
Frequentist analyses sometimes use surrogate outcomes 
in order to increase statistical power. 
A Bayesian approach may be more flexible with regards to 
surrogate outcomes because it can capture the uncertain 
relationship between the surrogate and the true patient-
important outcome, however, a Bayesian approach will not 
overcome a poorly-chosen surrogate outcome. 
Missing outcome data may 
impede trial analysis 
Conventional trials may become biased through missing 
outcome data. 
Bayesian approaches do not necessarily offer any better 
options with regards to missing data. 
Randomization is logistically 
difficult and may deter 
participation 
Randomizing patients to treatments can sometimes be a 
barrier for patients and clinicians to participate in trials. 
Randomization remains a central tool for quantitative causal 
inference, whether using frequentist or Bayesian methods. 
Informed consent can be 
burdensome and deter 
participation 
Processes of informed consent can be burdensome for 
clinicians and patients. 
Different analytic paradigms do not obviate the need for 
ethical informed consent in trials. 
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Caption: Figure 1 – Example Plot of Prior, Likelihood, and Posterior Distribution Using the Guérin (2013) “PROSEVA” Trial39
This figure shows the prior (red curve), likelihood of observed data (green curve), and posterior (blue curve) plotted together with absolute 
risk reduction on the x-axis and probability density on the y-axis. The prior distribution is skeptical, centered at an absolute risk reduction of 
0, with variance equivalent to a 400-person trial. The likelihood is centered at the observed absolute risk reduction of the trial and has lower 
variance than the prior because the trial enrolled 466 patients. The posterior combines the prior and likelihood, resulting in a compromise 
between skepticism (perhaps based on previous proning trials, or the broader context of clinical trials in ventilation) and the observed 
mortality reduction. Although the posterior distribution is attenuated relative to the data, the resulting posterior probability of exceeding 
the 4% minimum clinically important difference (blue shaded area) is 98%, providing strong evidence that proning is beneficial even if one is 
skeptical before seeing the data from Guérin et al. Similar plots with user-specified MCID and prior distributions are available for every trial 
in the analysis through the accompanying interactive app. 
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Caption: Figure 2 – Probability of Clinical Benefit Versus P-value 
This figure shows the relationship between the p-value and the posterior probability that the absolute risk reduction exceeds the minimum 
clinically relevant effect for each study. Each dot corresponds to a particular study. The color of the dot denotes agreement (blue) or 
potential disagreement (red) between frequentist and Bayesian analyses for that particular prior. Note that the blue dots in the quadrant 
with p-value < 0.05 and posterior probability of clinical benefit < 50% correspond to studies with p-value < 0.05 that showed harm. The 
posterior probability of exceeding the MCID increases as prior distributions shift from skeptical (left) to enthusiastic (right) but the p-values 
stay the same. 
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